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The Battle for International Law addresses the South-North contest over the
content and structure of international law during the period of decolonization in the
global South (1955-1975). Edited volumes are inherently risky because the quality
and perspectives of the various chapters can vary widely, resulting in thematic
incoherency. However, J. von Bernstorff and P. Dann have successfully assembled
many excellent chapters on varied topics by a diverse range of authors. Each
chapter contributes significantly to the editors’ overall goal “to provide an intellectual
history of the transformation of international law in the 1950s to 1970s and to offer
a better understanding of the contestations to the then- dominant perceptions of
order” (p. 3). The result is a must-read book for international law scholars. As a
scholar and teacher of Africa in the Global Legal System, I gained much from the
book. So did my students.
My contribution to this symposium focuses on Chapter 17 “Literal ‘Decolonization’ –
Re-reading African International Legal Scholarship through the African novel” by C.
Gevers. Intersecting law and literature, the chapter presents an illuminating analogy
between the trends in international law scholarship and literary texts by Africans
during the period at issue. Gevers revisits the familiar classification of African
international law scholarship into “weak” and “strong” strands and demonstrates that
a more nuanced understanding of African positions on international law emerges
when one considers contemporaneous developments in African literature and their
political and historical contexts. I wholeheartedly agree with this analysis.
Gevers begins with Gathii’s (1998) taxonomy of African international law scholarship
into “weak” and “strong” versions. Elias’ works represent the “weak” version of
African approaches to international law. Writing in the 1960s, Elias “emphasizes
Africa’s contribution to ‘universal’ international law and downplays colonialism [and
slavery] as a negligible part of” the history of international law (p. 386). For Elias,
decolonization is a literal event in which the former African colony becomes an
equal sovereign state in the community of nations. Elias does not question remnants
of colonialism in the content and structure of post-colonial international law and
institutions, according to Gevers, which gives rise to naïve optimism about Africa’s
place in the international order.
Gevers contrasts the “weak” version of African perspectives on international law
with the “strong” version. Umozurike, writing in the 1970s, was a proponent of the
“strong” version which problematizes the colonial origins of international law itself
and provides a radical critique of “Africa’s subordination in its international relations
as a legacy that is traceable to international law” (p. 387). For proponents of the
“strong” version, decolonization is not a single event but rather a process that only
begins with formal independence but must continue with a radical restructuring of
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international relations. This is “a very different story of international law” than the
“weak” version (id.)
Gevers suggests that the “weak” vs. “strong” classification of African international
law scholarship is largely decontextual and ahistorical. Indeed, African perspectives
on international law must be understood in their proper context and that context
is illuminated by examining parallel intellectual developments in African literature.
Elias (“weak” approach) wrote in the 1960s, at a time when African literary giants
such as Achebe and Ngugi embraced the English language and the novel genre as
appropriate forms for African literary expression. At the time, African writers were
optimistic about their ability to “Africanize” these Western forms by subjectivizing
their content. In other words, there was a strong parallel between the “weak”
approach to international law and contemporaneous African writers’ pragmatic
approach to colonial languages and genres. By contrast, when Umozurike (“strong”
approach) was writing on international law in the 1970s, African writers had begun to
critique colonial literary forms and languages. Ngugi, for example, came to believe
that “the continued use of colonial languages was simply neocolonialism” (p. 393).
In short, the 1970s witnessed an intellectual shift to a more radical understanding
of decolonization in both international law and literature, an elevation of substance
over form. African intellectuals no longer viewed decolonization as a single event but
recognized it as an ongoing process of critique and radical restructuring in the spirit
of Fanon.
I agree with Gevers that the “weak” – “strong” dichotomy of African approaches to
international law is overly simplistic and does not consider their varied historical
contexts. The “weak” scholars of international law began writing at a time (1960s)
when many African nations were still under the literal yoke of colonialism. The
process of formal independence had only just started. Namibia was illegally occupied
by South Africa, according to numerous UN General Assembly and Security Council
resolutions and an ICJ advisory opinion. Mozambique and Zimbabwe were still
bound by the colonial chains of Portugal and British settlers, respectively.
As Gevers notes, decolonization is a process, a dialectic conversation. It is not a
one-time event and thus Africans could not be expected to rest on the laurels of
formal independence. However, as even the perennially radical Fanon noted, the
first step toward liberation is formal independence. The enslaved must literally break
the physical chains as the first, essential step to freedom. In the case of national
decolonization, this meant fighting wars of national liberation and engaging in
shrewd geopolitical diplomacy within the existing international order. It also included
making impassioned moral and legal appeals to the UN based on legal principles the
creation of which Africans were not party to (e.g., the UN Charter, the UDHR, etc.)
due to their exclusion from the family of nations.
The foregoing measures, perhaps with the exception of armed struggle, were all
ways of working within the status quo. However, they were not “weak” approaches;
on the contrary, they were foundational and even radical for their time. Analogically
applying the same logic to African literature, and recognizing that Africa was said
to have no culture, no art, no history and, generally no civilization (Hegel), it was
a foundational and radical maneuver for African writers to dispel these racist and
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ethnocentric myths by demonstrating their mastery of the preeminent Western
literary form, the English novel (see Achebe, Ngugi, etc.). Similarly, the international
law that justified colonization of Africa was based on the premise that Africans are
uncivilized, have no culture and therefore are incapable of being sovereign members
of the community of nations (Anghie).
Perhaps instead of “weak”, then, “first generation” might be a more apt descriptor of
so-called “weak” strands of African international law scholarship. But not necessarily
first generation in a temporal sense, as Gevers notes, since national liberation
is a non-linear and dialectic process. First generation African literature and its
analogue, first generation African analyses of international law. For their time, these
first generation approaches were most appropriate, as the author argues, and
indeed radical. How could African nations have skipped the critical first step toward
liberation?
While I don’t disagree with the central theme of the book, its general outlook seems
deterministically pessimistic. Readers may come away from the book feeling
hopeless about the long-term promise of the post-colonial international political
and economic order for nations of the global South. What such pessimism might
imply, in turn, is that the newly independent countries have very little agency in the
international law arena. With this I disagree, especially concerning African nations
who are exercising their legal, economic, and political sovereignty in increasingly
bold and innovative ways – perhaps, the subject of a future book?
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